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MARQUETTE LAW REVIEW
VICARIOUS ADMISSIONS AND UTTERANCES
The subject of vicarious admissions and utterances has been the
topic of much comment and controversy. The courts and text writers
are often in conflict as to the effect to be given these types of statements.
It is the author's hope that this article will present some of the prob-
lems encountered and solutions offered in, perhaps, the most difficult
field of extra-judicial admissions, that of agent's statements regarding
tortious liability.
Perhaps, the best illustration of the whole problem can be shown
through a simple hypothetical fact situation which will be referred to
throughout this article as a means of showing the application of the
various theories of law proffered as governing the circumstances. The
fact situation involves a truck driver, agent, who made the following
statement after an intersectional collision; "I'm sorry lady, I didn't see
you coming." An attorney engaged by this woman faced the question
as to what value this statement of supposed carelessness has in sub-
stantively binding the corporate principal.
At the outset it appears apparent that the admissibility of a state-
ment of this nature in a suit against the principal would be of great
import in proving the negligence of the agent. But upon closer examina-
tion there seems to be a conflict as to whether principles of agency or
rules of evidence apply in ultimately determining the admissibility of
this declaration. Excepting Wisconsin, many courts have failed to dis-
tinguish between the evidentiary hearsay exception of spontaneous dec-
larations, which constitute part of the res gestae, and the agency rule
scope of authority, treating them as a single principle in making their
determination as to admissibility.' Professor Wigmore points out this
fallacy in stating:
. . . that there are two distinct and unrelated principles involved
must be apparent; and the sooner the courts insist on keeping
them apart, the better for the intelligent development of the law
of Evidence. Practically, the result of the two principles in appli-
cation are decidedly different; for upon the principle of the
Hearsay exception such statement may (if admissible) be re-
ceived against either party; but on the principle of agency against
the employer only.2
Thus, the declaration may be admissible under two distinct theories:
either as an exception to the hearsay rule or under a principle of agency.
An excellent statement as to the treatment and separability of these two
concepts is offered by Professor Mechem:




* . . although they (admissions) thus cannot be regarded as
authorized, the declarations and admissions of an agent may often
be put in evidence upon an entirely different ground, namely,
that they constitute a part of what is called the "res gestae."...
It does not necessarily depend upon the law of agency at all. It is
a rule of evidence and is just as applicable in a proper case to
one who was not an agent at all as to one who was an agent. ....
Before further analysis of these two principles, the uses of which
are generally determined by the facts of the particular case, it should be
noted that before an admission or utterance of this vicarious nature may
be allowed in evidence against the principal, the party offering the al-
leged admission must lay a proper foundation. The foundation must
show both the fact and scope of the agency; this is usually accomplished
by testimony of the alleged agent while he is under oath, or testimony
of any party who knows him to be the agent of the principal, or cir-
cumstantial evidence.4 However, under no circumstances may agency
be proved by past extra-judicial assertions or admissions of the alleged
agent.5
RiEs GESTAE
Under the res gestae rule of evidence, an utterance which is inad-
missible under the hearsay rule is saved and allowed because the facts
surrounding the declaration afford it credibility. The rule of res gestae
is based on the premise that, in the experience of mankind, statements
made at the time of the happening of the event itself are apt to be truth-
ful. 6 The test of admissibility of such declarations as constituting part
of the res gestae laid down in Kressin v. Chicago & N.W. Ry. Co.7 re-
quires the occurrence of an event so shocking or startling as to produce
nervous excitement, which in turn renders the declaration to be spon-
taneous, natural, impulsive, instructive and generated by an excited
feeling which extends unbroken from moment of event which it illus-
trates. A further requirement is that the statement must be made before
there has been time to contrive and misrepresent.
The Wisconsin court has not definitely limited the time during which
the utterance must be made to constitute a part of the res gestae,8 but
the court looks to the facts and circumstances surrounding the declara-
tion in each particular case. However, it appears that in cases of this
sort time becomes a very important element.9 With the passage of time
between act and declaration, the inference that the utterance was a
32 MECHEM, AGENCY §1793, at 1369 (1914).
4 MCCOR IICK, EVIDENcE 519 (1954).
5 MECHEM, AGENCY OUmLNES §484 (1923.)
6 Shiefel v. State, 180 Wis. 186, 192 N.W. 386 (1923).
7 194 Wis. 480, 215 N.W. 908 (1928).
sAndrzejewski v. Northwestern Fuel Co., 158 Wis. 170, 148 N.W. 37 (1914).
9 Klein v. Montgomery Ward & Co., 263 Wis. 317, 57 N.W.2d 188 (1953).
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product of the speaker's mind prompted solely by the startling event"
is negated because the elements of possible deliberation and contrivance
have now entered the picture. Thus, in those instances where the lapse
in time before the alleged admission was made is appreciable, the tend-
ency of the courts is to treat the agent's declaration as a "mere narra-
tive" of a past event.:" Under these circumstances it is not admissible
or binding on the principal. Applying this rule to the hypothetical fact
situation, it appears that if the declarations were made when the driver
was alighting from the cab of his truck or within a short period there-
after, his spontaneous declaration or excited utterance would be ad-
missible as part of the res gestae. Here, the statement in question con-
cerns some main act (the accident), and the proponent is present and
affected by its influence. Therefore, it may be said that the statement
was a part of the act-a part of the res gestae-in that the events were
speaking for themselves through the instinctive words and acts of the
participants. As a result of being part of the res gestae, the declaration
or utterance is competent not only against the agent, but also serves as
original evidence against the principal.'12
AUTHORIZED ADMISSIONS
If the proponent of the alleged admission does not meet the neces-
sary qualifications to come within the res gestae exception, then princi-
ples of agency apply in determining the admissibility of the declaration.
In most instances these rules 13 serve to exclude rather than admit1 4
such statements into evidence, for in the area of tortious liability, the
agent's declarations are deemed not to be made within the scope of his
authority, that is, his ability to speak for his principal on such matters., 5
Taking the hypothetical fact situation as an example, it can be seen that
under the rules of agency the mere fact that the agent has authority to
drive the truck does not imply that he has the authority to make state-
10 Scrafield v. Rudy, 266 Wis. 530, 64 N.W.2d 189 (1954).
11 MCCORMICK, EVIDENCE 518 (1954).
'
2 Levandowski v. Studney, 249 Wis. 421, 25 N.W.2d 59 (1946).
13 RESTATEMENT (SECOND), AGENCY §286 (1954) reads;
In an action between the principal and a third person, statements of
an agent to a third person are admissable in evidence against the
principal to prove the truth of the facts asserted in them as though
made by the principal, if the agent was authorized to make the state-
ment or was authorized to make on the principal's behalf, any state-
ments concerning the subject matter.
14 There are a number of cases holding such statements admissable, regardless
of want of authority, if the agent was employed for the purpose of giving
information. Included among this group of cases are the following: Arenson
v. Skouras Theatres Corp., 131 N.J.L. 303, 36 A.2d 761 (1944) (report of
theatre employee to manager as to condition causing injury, in presence
of plaintiff); Home Ins. Co. of N.Y. v. Hall, 192 Ark. 283, 91 S.W.2d 609(1936) (admission of insurance adjuster seeking to settle claim, that policy
had not been cancelled) ; See MCCORMICK, EVIDENCE 518 (1954).
25 Hamilton v. Reinmann, 233 Wis. 572, 577, 290 N.W. 194 (1940).
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ments concerning his manner of driving.16 Thus, upon showing a lack
of express or implied 7 authorization, the principal is in the position to
claim that such declarations in no way bind him and that, standing alone,
they do come within the hearsay rule because:
. . . The agent may make admissions which will charge himself,
and the principal may make admissions to bind himself, but
usually one man can not admit things to charge another. An agent
may confess his own negligence or default so far as his own
liability is concerned, but he cannot ordinarily be deemed author-
ized to confess his principal's negligence or defaults. So far as
the principal is concerned, if he does not care to admit matters
affecting his liability or interests, he is entitled to have the ques-
tion tried by the regular and established methods of determining
liability .... 18
Given the hypothetical fact situation and excepting it from the res
gestae qualification, the third party, under present law,19 seems to fail
at getting the agent's declaration admitted into evidence, because the
truck driver's authority to speak for his principal on tort matters is un-
usual and highly unlikely. At best, the declaration could serve only for
purposes of impeachment"0 in the event that the truck driver, upon
being called to the stand by his principal, should happen to give testi-
mony inconsistent with his prior declaration. Under these circumstances
the declaration's sole use would be limited to affecting the witness's
credibility rather than affecting the substantive liability of the principal.
CRITICISM OF THE AUTHORIzED ADiviISSION DOCTRINE
A close examination of this doctrine has brought a rash of criticism
from several text writers21 and a number of courts. 2 2 The principal ob-
jection stems basically from the inequitable and illogical results that
occur upon the application of the doctrine. A noteworthy example of
this appears in Rankin v. Brocton Public Market.23 In that case the
16 RESTATEMENT (SECOND), AGENCY §288 (1954) states:
(1) Authority to do an act or conduct a transaction does not of itself
include authority to make statements concerning the act or tran-
saction.(2) Authority to make statements of fact does not of itself include
authority to make statements admitting liability because of such
facts.
17 Rudzinski v. Warner Theatres Inc., 16 Wis.2d 241, 114 N.W.2d 466 (1962).
1.82 MECHEmi, AGENCY §1792, at 1368 (71914).
19 Supra note 17.
20 Burton v. Brown, 219 Wis. 520, 263 N.W. 573 (1935) ; Hamilton v. Reinmann,
233 Wis. 572, 290 N.W. 194 (1940).
214 WIGMORE, EviDENCE §1078 (1940) ; McCoRnic, EviDENcE 519 (1954) ; See
also Morgan, The Rationale of Vicarious Admissions, 42 HARv. L. REv. 461
(1929).
22 Examples of such criticism can be found in the following: Myrick v. Lloyd,
158 Fla. 47, 27 So2d 615 (1946); Whitaker v. Keough, 144 Neb. 790, 14
N.W.2d 596 (1944); Slifka v. Johnson, 161 F.2d 467 (2d Cir. 1947); Martin
v. Savage Truck Lines Inc., 121 F.Supp. 417 (D.D.C. 1954).
22257 Mass. 6, 153 N.E. 97 (1926).
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court excluded a saleslady's admission that she had tossed the bottle
that hit the plaintiff, customer, on the head on the premise that the
saleslady "had no authority to bind the defendant." Professor Wigmore
in discussing this case finds it hard to draw this narrow line between
the doing of the act and the relating of how one acted:
. . . she had authority to sell goods and make a profit for de-
fendant; then why not the authority to say how she sold them?
Such quibbles bring the law justly in contempt with laymen.24
There is merit in such criticism when one looks to the basic premise
of the principal's liability under the doctrine of respondeat superior,
which:
. . . by legal intendment, the act of the empoyee becomes the act
of the employer, the individuality of the employee being identi-
fied with that of the employer. The latter is deemed construc-
tively present; the act of the employee is his act, and he becomes
accountable as for his own proper act or omission. The law im-
putes to the master the act of the servant, and if the act is negli-
gent or wrongful proximately resulting in injury to a third per-
son, the negligence or wrongful conduct is the negligence or
wrongful conduct of the master for which he is liable. .... 25
Thus, it seems illogical to place liability on the principal for the
negligent acts of his agent, and then fashion a doctrine that restricts
the use of statements which patently show knowledge of carelessness in
performance of the authorized act. This outlook is especially puzzling,
because of necessity in modern times principals, such as corporations,
can only function through the acts entrusted to their agents. Yet, as a
result of the application of this doctrine, the agent's accident or mishap
allows the principal, in effect, to sever the relationship when the agent
is duly required to give an explanation concerning what transpired in
carrying out the entrusted act.2 6 Having such protection under the doc-
trine, it becomes unrealistic to assume that any principal will place
24 4 WIGMORE, EVIDENCE §1078, at 121 (1940).
25 35 Ai. Jua. Master and Servant §543, at 973 (1941).
2r An enlightening discussion of this point appears in Martin v. Savage Truck
Lines Inc., 121 F.Supp. 417, 419 (D.D.C. 1954). In holding a truck driver's
admission to an investigating officer as binding upon the principal, the court
states:
. * . to say in these circumstances, that the owner of a motor truck
may constitute a person his agent for the purpose of the operation
of such truck over public streets and highways, and to say at the same
time that such operator is no longer the agent when an accident oc-
curs, for the purpose of truthfully relating the facts concerning the
occurrence to an investigating police officer on the scene shortly there-
after, seems to me to erect an untenable fiction, neither contemplated by
the parties nor sanctioned by public policy. It is almost like saying that
a statement against interest in the instant case could only have been
made had the truck been operated by an officer or the board of direc-




authority in his agent to speak on tort matters which might be detri-
mental to the principal's own interest.2 7
Another criticism of the authorized admission approach relates to
the weak basis of ultimate exclusion of such statements under the hear-
say rule. In light of the relationship of principal and agent, with its
apparent unity of interest in performance of the authorized act, it ap-
pears illogical to exclude the statement of the agent regarding the act.
This same statement would be admissible if made by the principal and
possibly would have been made by him had he been confronted by the
same circumstances. Granted, the application of the hearsay rule may
be theoretically sound if we look only to the mere physical absence of
the principal at the time the statement was made, but upon adopting a
broader view based on the relationship, exclusion seems illogical. If the
law deems the principal constructively present in the agent's acts, then
why should not the same approach be followed as to declarations directly
explaining its performance? It is not normal for an employee to make
statements against his employer's interest ;29 this is especially true in
reference to false statements. An employee realizes the dangers and
repercussions that such statements may have on his employment.
The basic reason for excluding hearsay statements rests on the in-
herent doubt as to their trustworthiness. When the character and cir-
cumstances surrounding these types of statements are considered, it
becomes difficult to realistically argue the issue of untrustworthiness
contemplated by the rule. The human tendency for one involved in an
accident or mishap is to deny, rather than to admit, fault for the event's
occurrence. In such instances, if considerations of truth are to be para-
mount, to reason that a party will question himself as to the affect his
declarations will have on his principal and then go on to make an un-
true statement seems to be incongruous. It seems obvious that a party's
reaction would be one of fear and concern as to what will happen to
him as a result of the mishap. This fear for personal interests would
induce an agent to think twice before making any statement that could
have possible adverse effects and thus would negate the idea of the
declarations being untrue. Realistically, absence of admissions is gen-
erally the case. This absence serves both to protect the agent's individual
interest and the principal's interest. Conversely, why should the admis-
sion, if made, lack the characteristic of trustworthiness? This exclusion
by the court serves as an unmerited protection to the principal's interest
when the declaration is adverse to it. In effect, the authorized admission
approach is inequitable, and serves to exclude relevant evidence because
27 Supra note 17, at 257, 114 N.W.2d at 471.
28Myrick v. Lloyd, 158 Fla. 47, 27 So.2d 615 (1946).
- See McCoRMIcK, EVIExcE 519 (1954).
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the jury is placed in a position where it can merely draw inferences
from occurrences on issues subject to actual explanation.
In light of this, it is noteworthy to mention the possibility that the
Wisconsin court will liberalize the test as to admissibility of vicarious
statements in the future. Justice Gordon in his concurring opinion in
Rudzinski v. Warner Theatres, Inc.30 took cognizance of the inequitable
results that occur when the authorized admission doctrine is applied.
His approach, though new to Wisconsin jurisprudence, is similar to past
remedial proposals on the subject.31 Under his test, the equities would
be more readily balanced in that blanket exclusion of such declarations
would become a thing of the past, while still providing the principal
with adequate safeguards against the incompetent and untruthful state-
ments of agents. The test offers the trial court a workable standard in
determining the admissibility of declarations in that it would exclude
the admissions of agents when:
a) He purports to speak on a subject beyond the scope of his duties
or personal knowledge, or
b) He is shown to have an anintus against his principal which nega-
tives the trustworthiness of his declaration, or
c) His admission is made after his employment has been termin-
ated.3
2
Analyzing this test, it can be seen that the principal change lies in
the fact that scope of duties, rather than authorization to speak, becomes
the criteria for determining the admissibility of these types of state-
ments. This concept would encompass a view of the agent's position as
well as its correlative duties in determining whether the agent was in
fact qualified to comment on the happenings. The prime question be-
comes whether the act or omission, which is subject to litigation, natur-
ally arises or flows out of the scope of his employment.
Applying this test to the hypothetical situation, the driver of the
truck would be able to bind his principal with admissions about his
careless driving, for such declarations naturally flow from the acts en-
trusted to him by his employer. Conversely, the truck driver would not
be in the position to bind his principal on subjects such as corporate
30 16 Wis.2d 241, 114 N.W.2d 466 (1962). justice Fairchild joined in the opinion.3 1 UNIFORM RULES OF EVIDENCE 63 (9) provides:
As against a party a statement would be admissable if made by the
declarent at the hearing if, (a) the statement concerned a matter within
the scope of agency or employment of the declarent for the party and
was made before the determination of such relationship . . . or (c)
one of the issues between the party and the proponent of the evi-
dence of the statement is a legal liability of the declarent and the
statement tends to establish that liability.
32 Supra note 17, at 257, 114 N.W.2d at 474.
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policy or operation, for these matters bear no relation to the scope of
his employment. 3
The other tenets encompassed in the test are self-explanatory. Ele-
ments such as personal knowledge, hostility towards one's employer, or
termination of employment are additional factors to be examined to in-
sure the needed trustworthiness of the agent's extra-judicial admission,
before they would be allowed in evidence. On the whole, this test with
its realistic premises would broaden the strict common law approach to
a position more consonant with happenings in modem times.
CONCLUSION
The present legal tests of admissibility in the area of vicarious ad-
missions seem unable to cope with the problem adequately. This is es-
pecially true where tort liability is concerned. The hearsay exception,
which allows admissibility of spontaneous declarations or excited utter-
ances under the res gestae doctrine, is a limited concept. In many of
these cases, the stringent qualifications embodied in the rule cannot be
met by the agent's statement. Absent these qualifications the authorized
admission approach is the only avenue to admissibility of the statement.
This avenue, in most cases, is virtually a dead-end, for few agents have
the ability to speak for the principal regarding their torts or negligence.
This narrowness makes the test one of exclusion. Relevant evidence,
therefore, becomes inadmissible under rules of law that appear weak
and unrealistic when applied to the facts of the case.
When one looks to the relationship of principal and agent, one
finds a relation in which the law deems the principal constructively
present in the acts of his agent. But why, upon mishap, should the prin-
cipal be in the position effectively to sever this relationship as to admis-
sions of negligence in the performance of the act?
Reflecting on these concepts, the opinion of the author is that the
test offered by justice Gordon should be adopted. This test presents a
more realistic and equitable approach to the problem by tending to ad-
mit relevant testimony of what transpired while preserving a protection
for the principal against the incompetent and untruthful statements of
agents.
If a question remains as to whether, in fact, the alleged admission
was made, the determination should be left to the trier of fact. Matters
of credibility and weight of testimony truly rest within their province.
JEROME: E. GULL
33 Supra note 17, at 251, 114 N.W.2d at 471.
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